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Abstract—Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a popular
design paradigm for distributed systems today. Its dynamics
and loose coupling are predestined for self-adaptive systems.
This adaptivity and complexity, however, opens many chances
for a failure. Therefore, a clear understanding of the kinds of
faults that may occur is necessary for detection, tolerance, and
testing, e.g. by fault injection. For this purpose, we present a
fault taxonomy for service-oriented architecture. Starting with a
definition of service and SOA, we describe and analyze different
structures and the process of service invocation with a five step
model. Furthermore, we describe possible faults and define SOA-
specific faults as a new fault class that extends the known fault
set for distributed systems. The application of our fault taxonomy
is demonstrated with the use case of an online airline reservation
system. We conclude with the benefits of our fault taxonomy for
designing and testing SOA-based systems.
Index Terms—SOA, dependability, testing, fault taxonomy,
fault injection
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer-based infrastructures are a necessity for many
companies to handle their daily work today [1]. A big part of
their turnover is dependent on the system’s availability, relia-
bility, safety, security or short: its working ability. Downtime
of the system is costly because it slows down the business
or brings it to a halt. Thus, the companies strongly rely on
the correctness of the underlying software and hardware. This
confidence needs some backup, i.e. justification for the reliance
on the system. Some means to verify correctness of the system
or to strengthen the company’s trust in the system are formal
methods like static analysis or model checking but they usually
do not scale well to industrial complexity levels so mostly
testing is used in practice.
Additionally, the information system infrastructure of most
companies is based on distributed systems, which consist of
multiple independent computers connected by a network. A
common design paradigm for distributed systems is Service-
Oriented Architecture (SOA). In SOA, service providers and
service consumers are loosely coupled. New services can be
discovered and used on the fly using service brokers such
as Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI).
Another important aspect about SOA is its ability to connect
systems running on different platforms and to react to changes
in the system infrastructure. Connecting different platforms
through a common communication technology increases the
interoperability among systems. Dynamic binding of services
enables their self-adaptivity and self-management. Neverthe-
less, all these options do not only bear prospects of improved
infrastructure - they can also be sources of serious failures.
Therefore, much effort has to be put in detecting, analyzing
and handling faults while testing the system. The running
system is subject to the same caution. As we already stated, the
technology of SOA brings many possibilities of dealing with
different servers, clients or services. We have to categorize
the possible faults to be generally aware of them because
the corresponding system parts can be faulty. This is very
important in guaranteeing a certain level of quality. Finally,
this is not just important for ordinary applications - it is also
critical for security-relevant tasks.
For verification issues, there are many formal methods
available. However, because services and software are most
often informal and the complexity of the distributed system
is too high, most formal approaches fail here. So, we resort
to testing. One wide-spread technique in this area is fault
injection. Therefore, we need to know about the possible types
of faults. In this paper, we list several steps that are essential
for SOA and use them to build up a SOA-specific fault
taxonomy. With knowledge about possible faults, we can test
our services by observing their interaction with faulty services
that are created via fault injection. Thus, we can stepwise
improve the system’s robustness already at the development
stage and we can test the single components more thoroughly.
Another way to increase availability and reliability of SOA
components is to refine possible reactions to faults occur-
ring while the system is operating. In general, this can be
done either through redundancy in space (e.g. duplication
of systems) or redundancy in time (e.g. detecting faults and
exception handling). Either way, the detection of faults and
the knowledge about these faults are essential. Therefore, we
present a fault taxonomy for service-oriented architectures,
which is sub-divided into five steps according to the SOA
service invocation process. For each of these steps, possible
faults are shown and supported by an example.
The paper is organized as follows: Related work is discussed
in Section 2. In Section 3, we justify the necessity of testing.
The following Section 4 gives a definition of SOA with a
conceptual view on it with five steps required to do a service
invocation in an SOA. In the 5th Section, we describe the fault
taxonomy which is followed by an example application for our
taxonomy in Section 6. Finally, we present conclusions and an
outlook on future work in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK
Fault injection is a common method to test computer system
for fault tolerance and reliability [2] [3]. In literature about
distributed systems, the focus is usually set on one kind of
fault: hardware, software, or network. Cristian [4] proposed
a fault taxonomy for computer systems which was extended
by Laranjeira et al. [5] and applied to parallel and distributed
systems. Hayes [6] developed a fault taxonomy for the NASA
used in the development for the ISS project. His taxonomy
is NASA-specific but can be generalized to be applied to any
other software system. The experiences gained from using the
taxonomy are described as well. In our work, we focus on
SOA and introduce a new class of SOA-specific faults and
define a fault taxonomy for services.
Many methods and technologies have been developed to
describe and analyze hardware faults. Hardware architectural
issues are discussed, in [7], [8]. The authors describe hardware
faults and fault tolerant distributed systems. Arlat et al. [9]
describe levels of abstraction for fault injection and make use
of different models. Hardware faults can be the root cause for
faults in service-oriented architecture as they cause crashes or
execution faults.
Software faults are difficult to describe as they cause
side effects that cannot be foreseen and models are often
incomplete. A short section tackling that topic can be found
in [8] where the authors claim that software faults often
interact and errors are grouped together. Madeira et al. [10]
classify software faults into assignment, checking, interface,
timing/serialization, algorithm, and function faults. They use
these types to emulate software faults by fault injection. Li
et al. [11] examine the effect of software to the risk of
failure of a system. They compiled a taxonomy and provide
a validation. Bondavalli et al. are assessing and reducing
the cost of software fault tolerance in [12]. Some software
faults in services cannot be discovered before execution. This
makes them impossible to detect for service discovery and
composition engines. Beizer [3] collects statistics from various
software projects. He deduces a fault taxonomy subdividing
the reasons for faults in requirements, features, system struc-
ture, input data, software coding, interfaces, integration, and
testing. Beizer focuses on all possible sources of error. Instead,
we concentrate just on observable behavior because our system
should be able to react automatically.
Network faults are well described and analyzed. Nowa-
days, computer networks are packet based. Possible faults
range from routing, missing, or abandoned packets caused by
congestion via overflow and wrong routing to authorization
conflicts. Some network protocols like TCP already provide
fault tolerance. TCP provides a reliable connection which
guarantees correct transmission of data. Applications can use
these protocols and therefore do not have to handle these faults
themselves. As application in SOA are distributed applications
that are connected by a network, all network faults will effect
the service execution.
In the area of fault injection for web services the focus
usually is on altering the Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP) [13] messages exchanged among client and provider.
Looker and Xu are assessing the dependability of web services
in [14]. Faults are injected into the SOAP XML files and the
dependability of the web services is assessed at the network
level.
III. NECESSITY OF TESTING
Software testing is one of the most important techniques
to find faults or increase the dependability, i.e. the pro-
grammer’s and user’s faith in the correctness of the tested
system. There are many formal approaches to guarantee a
system’s correctness like static analysis or model checking.
But their application is limited because they assume a formally
specified system. Unfortunately, most systems are described
only informally. The corresponding problems are described in
[3] by the following statements: 1) We can never be sure that
our specification is correct. 2) No exerciser can verify every
correct program. 3) We can never be sure, that the exerciser
is correct.
Thus, we rely on testing and therefore we have to ensure that
our test suite covers a big part of the possible fault classes.
This is usually achieved by using test coverage criteria that
describe certain criteria that need to be fulfilled by the test
suite. For instance, the most important control-flow based
coverage criteria are statement coverage, branch coverage, or
Modified Condition / Decision Coverage (MC/DC) [15]. These
can almost exclusively be used for white-box testing or model-
based black-box testing. Details are omitted here but more
information can be found in [3], [16], [17]. There are also
already some commercial tools that support automated test
case generation [18], [19], [20], [21]. However, we follow
another way to guarantee a certain quality of the test suite:
First, we identify possible or expected faults following our
taxonomy. Then, we inject the faults in the system, and,
finally, we design test cases that are specially designed to find
these faults. Obviously, the success of such test cases strongly
depends on the quality of the underlying fault taxonomy.
Beizer [3] gathers information about reasons for faults
from various software projects. The faults can be found in
requirements, features, system structure, input data, software
coding, interfaces, integration, or testing. Beizer focuses on
every possible source of error, whereas we just focus on
the observable errors. We restrict our taxonomy because the
system should be able to react automatically to such errors
and it can only react to things it can observe. Furthermore,
Beizer also weighted these sources of errors according to the
frequency in which they occur (see Fig.1). Structural faults,
functionality faults, implementation and integration faults are
very important for SOA and together they reach a frequency
of about 60%.
Once we obtain such a taxonomy, we enable testers to
check the robustness of distributed systems by systematically
injecting all the described faults (fault injection) and watch
the consequences on the system behavior. In this paper, we
present a corresponding fault taxonomy for web services.
Fig. 1. Fault frequency by Beizer
Fig. 2. SOA structure
IV. SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE
Service-Oriented Architecture ([22], [23], [24]) is widely
accepted as design paradigm for distributed systems. The
Web Services standard [25] uses the Web Service Description
Language (WSDL) [26] to describe services and SOAP for
communication with services.
A. SOA Structure
The basic assumption of SOA is that there are many
consumers that require services. In literature, consumers are
also referred to as clients or customers. These terms are
used interchangeably here. On the other side, there are many
providers that provide services on the network. These two
groups have to be linked together in a dynamic and adaptive
way. This is usually done by a service broker [27], [28].
Service providers register their services at the broker, ser-
vice consumers request a service from the service broker,
which returns a known provider for the requested service.
Consumer and provider agree on the semantics. The consumer
then binds himself to the service provider and uses the service.
The structure of this architecture is shown in Fig. 2.
However, this is not the only possible architecture for a
SOA. The Adaptive Service Grid (ASG) project [29] sees SOA
as a grid which handles all service discovery and binding.
Consumers ask the grid for a specific service. The grid then
tries to find the specified service among its registered service
providers. In case it cannot find the service the grid tries
to compose the service out of the available ones based on
Fig. 3. ASG platform structure
the semantic description. The only interaction partner for
consumers respectively service providers is the grid (Fig. 3).
In the end, all SOA architectures provide a way to dynam-
ically link service consumers and service providers. There-
fore, SOA basically consists of five steps: service publishing,
service discovery, service composition, service binding, and
service execution. These steps are explained in the next
section.
B. SOA Steps
A clear understanding of all steps for SOA is necessary to
establish a comprehensive fault taxonomy of possible faults.
Essentially, all five steps have to be undertaken each time a
service is executed. Following this paradigm is necessary for
the loosely coupled components required for SOA. However,
the first steps before the service execution can be “cached”.
For faster service delivery, they do not have to be repeated
each time. However, this would make the quick reaction to
changing service environments impossible, i.e. caused by new
service providers or crashed services.
1) Publishing: Service providers offer services on the net-
work. They have to provide the services and the corresponsing
service descriptions. All services have to be self-descriptive.
Web services are described by WSDL documents. The first
version of WSDL was insufficient for a full SOA as it covers
the functional interface specification only. A full SOA service
description has to cover all service properties and semantics.
For instance, it may be a textual description which results in
a loss of the capability to automatically discover and compose
services. Therefore, structured approaches like WSDL exten-
sions are used for the description of non-functional properties.
Ontology languages like OWL-S [30] are also used for the
semantic description.
2) Discovery: A consumer looking for an appropriate ser-
vice to perform a desired task has to discover a matching
service among all the service providers. He must have a
clear understanding of the required service in form of a
service description as it is offered by the service providers.
Subsequently, the description of the desired service and the
description of the offered service have to be compared. If they
match, the required service has been successfully discovered.
3) Composition: Perhaps no service matching to the con-
sumer’s needs exists. In this case, it may still be possible to
compose the service out of the existing ones. Service compo-
sition describes the combination of two or more services to
one complex service either by service choreography or service
orchestration. Functional and non-functional properties have
to be taken into account to create the composition [31]. The
result of service choreography and service orchestration is the
same: a new service providing a more complex functionality.
The approaches however, are quite different.
Service Choreography describes the composition of services
by defining rules for the collaboration of services (declarative).
There is no central instance controlling the composition pro-
cess. The rules within the service environment describe the
externally observable behavior (compare [32], [33], [24]). An
attempt to describe service composition using choreography is
the Web Service Choreography Interface (WSCI) [34], [32].
Service Orchestration describes the collaboration of services
controlled by an external component called orchestration en-
gine. This engine sees the services from an external perspec-
tive and knows the rules to compose them (compare [31], [33],
[24]). The Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) uses
this approach [35].
4) Binding: After discovering an appropriate service de-
livering the desired functionality, the consumer service binds
itself to the service for the execution. At this point, side aspects
of the service can be set. Security and AAA (authentication,
authorization, and accounting) issues fall into this category.
5) Execution: Once the service is bound to a consumer, the
service or the service composition can be executed. The ser-
vice input parameters are transmitted to the service provider,
the service is executed and the output parameters are returned
to the consumer.
C. Shortcomings of Current SOA Implementations
The most commonly used implementation of SOA is the
web services standard. Web services are described by WSDL
files, discovered by UDDI, and communication is usually done
via SOAP. Composition usually works using BPEL or web
service choreography. However, these standards do not quite
fulfill the promise of a dynamic system with loosely coupled
components.
WSDL files usually contain the functional specification
of the service only. Therefore, UDDI search requests allow
service discovery based on this specification. Without further
information about the service, the actual service actions and
their circumstances (semantics and contract) remain unclear.
Several extensions to the WS standard cover other properties
but no common basis exist.
This leads to the next problem: automatic service compo-
sition. Without the essential information about the service’s
Fig. 4. Fault classes
actual implementation, automatic composition is impossible.
Until now, only semi-automatic and manual approaches exist
(e.g. BPEL).
The need for further information about the service is usually
circumvented by using only services that are provided by the
developer team that also implements the client. This limits the
use of the SOA extremely as these services are rather closely
coupled and no dynamic service binding is done.
V. FAULT TAXONOMY
Now, faults may occur during all the steps of the SOA
process. If detected, they will cause errors which will lead to
a failure unless the SOA structure is capable of handling those
errors, e.g. service crashes can be handled by duplicating those
services or using an equivalent service by a different provider.
Besides the SOA specific faults, all presented faults can
occur in a distributed system. These are hardware faults,
software faults, network faults, and faults caused by the
operator (Fig. 4).
While these faults apply to distributed systems in general,
this paper focuses on typical faults applying to SOA. So, we
leave all general elements of distributed systems aside and
focus solely on the essential steps of SOA and all faults
correlated to them. The other faults are described in more
detail in the related work.
SOA faults apply to service-oriented architectures only,
independently of the used technology (e.g. web services). As
described in section IV, SOA implementations dynamic link
service providers and consumers, which leads to a loosely
coupled distributed system. This dynamic linking allows SOA
implementations to adapt to quickly changing environments
and situations. Of course, this dynamic behavior brings in
new sources of failures and possible faults. Faults can occur
in all of the described five steps. Our taxonomy starts very
general but is refined within each category. This generalization
allows a complete coverage of all possible faults. Of course,
the taxonomy has to be refined for each domain to allow
the system to also react to the domain-specific faults in
a reasonable way and allow fault detection. Fig. 5 gives
an overview of possible faults. They are explained in the
following sections. The names printed in italic correspond to
the names in the figure.
Fig. 5. Taxonomy of SOA-specific faults
A. Publishing Faults
During publishing, the service is deployed on a server so
it can be executed and the service description is made public.
Service Description Faults are similar to specification faults
that occur when the description of the service is incorrect. The
description may be faulty itself (Description Incorrect) or it
just may not match the deployed service (Service Description
Mismatch). Faults caused by an incorrect description can be
detected by checking the description file only. It is a Format
Fault when the format of the description is incorrect. For
instance, a XML file may be not well formed because it misses
some tags. The content may be wrong (Content Fault) if, for
example, prescribed security algorithms do not exist at all.
The deployed service may not match the provided descrip-
tion. There is an Incomplete Description if the service provides
more features than are published ones in the description. If
the description mentions features, which are not provided by
the deployed service, these are called Missing Features. If the
feature described does not match the feature actually provided
it is an Incorrect Feature Description.
Service Deployment Faults occur when the service is not
successfully deployed on the target platform. If the software
versions of service and server do not match and therefore the
execution will be not possible or limited there is an Incom-
patibility of Service/Server. In case the service is Missing a
Required Resource (e.g. a link to a data base), the service may
be deployed successfully but will fail to perform.
Format faults can be detected using verification techniques,
e.g. XML checkers. Content faults can be detected by vali-
dating using predefined criteria. Deployment faults cannot be
detected before the execution. So, only tests can reveal them.
B. Discovery Faults
Faults during discovery can happen either on search invo-
cation or returning the found services.
The relatively easy fault to detect is No Service Found. This
may be for several reasons: Either the Required Service is Not
Existing or it is Not Listed In Lookup Service.
A Wrong Service Found fault will be difficult to detect.
The fault can only be detected in Step 5 when the service is
really executed. The found service may be wrong if either the
client specified Incorrect Search Criteria, or there is a Faulty
Lookup Service, or the provided specification does not match
the actual provided service.
Any step from 2 to 5 may Time Out. This can be due to a
Server Crash which can be caused by hardware or software
or a Communication Failure which is a network fault. For
simplification, this is only shown in Step 5.
C. Composition Faults
The ability to compose services to create new services is
an essential part of SOA. If the composition process fails
the composition engine will return No Valid Composition.
This can be due to various reasons. There may be Incom-
patible Components that cannot be connected. For instance,
two location based services use different coordinate systems
for specifying the position. If Parts of the Composition Are
Missing, required services to translate between services are
missing. For example, a converter service from Euro to Dollar
may be missing.
If the composition engine is unable to detect the faults
during composition, the returned composition may not meet
the specified requirements (Composition Faulty). This may
either be because certain properties are not supported by all
parts of the composition. For example, security may only be
guaranteed by the first and last service, but not in between.
Then, Criteria are Not Met. Or, the used Composition Engine
is Faulty and does not produce the desired service composi-
tion. Another possibility is if preconditions, postconditions, or
invariants are not fulfilled. Then, the contract of the service is
violated (Contract Not Met).
D. Binding Faults
During binding, the service consumer and service provider
negotiate the conditions to execute the service. The Binding
may be Denied if the AAA component denies the access.
That is, either Authorization Denied, Authentication Failed,
or Accounting Problems occur. Insufficient Security may also
be a reason, e.g. one side does not trust the certificate of the
other.
Also, the client may be bound to the wrong service without
noticing. This can either be caused by a wrong service de-
scription, failed service discovery, or even malicious methods
like spoofing.
E. Execution Faults
Execution faults occur when the service is executed but the
result does not match the expected outcome.
The service may just crash. The server will usually notice
the Crashed Service and notify the client about the failure.
If the service delivers an Incorrect Result this can be either
due to a software fault (Service Faulty) or Incorrect Input.
Incorrect inputs may be caused by a Conversion Fault or the
Input Range may be Exceeded.
VI. AN EXAMPLE
We demonstrate the application of our taxonomy with a
typical example of a travel agency. In this example, a customer
books a trip using a travel agency service. His trip booking
consists of a flight reservation to his destination, a rental car
to be picked up at the airport, and the hotel reservation. This
service is usually realized by one travel agency service that
uses three other sub-services. As we want to show the benefits
our SOA-specific fault taxonomy, we focus only on one part
of the whole example and describe this part in more detail. We
chose the airline reservation service (Fig. 6). All listed faults
can likewise occur in the other two services.
Suppose, a traveler wants to fly from London to Paris.
Consequently, he needs to find an appropriate flight and has to
pay for it. He specifies the date and time he wants to fly and
provides his credentials (e.g. name, credit card number). The
Fig. 6. Travel agency example with focus on airline reservation service
Fig. 7. Airline reservation service
airline reservation service will then try different airlines until
it finds an appropriate flight and then call a payment service.
The traveler enters his personal information into a form on
a web server he accessed using a standard browser. In our
context, this web server has two roles: it is the client that
uses web services to perform the booking and it is the service
orchestration engine as it composes the airline and payment
services (see Fig. 7).
First, the Airline Reservation Service has to find an ap-
propriate flight. The discovery service returns three different
airline reservation services. The first returned service (A1) is
executed without problems but returns no available flights. Ap-
parently, this is wrong. This fault was caused by an incorrect
date format: The airline did offer some flights but the service
specified the format of the date with (DDMMYY) but the
actual implementation required the format (YYMMDD). In
our fault taxonomy, this is a Service/Description Mismatch.
The second airline reservation service (A2) is checked for
a valid composition with a payment service. Here, our test
person is not able to pay in English Pound Sterling £. To find a
valid service composition, the orchestration engine tries to find
a currency converter service. As there is no currency converter
service, the engine is unable to use this service and temporarily
generates a No Valid Composition, or more specific, a Parts
of Composition Missing error.
Finally, the third airline (A3) offers a matching flight.
Additionally, we need a payment service to pay for the flight.
Again, our orchestration engine can choose between three
different services. While building up a secure channel, the first
payment service (P1) denies the binding because it does not
trust the security certificates provided by the airline service
(Insufficient Security fault).
The second payment service (P2) accepts the certificate
but returns an error during execution because the parameter
specified cannot be interpreted. Instead of a decimal point,
the amount of Euro and Cent is separated by a comma. This
is a fault during specification (Service/Description Mismatch)
that cannot be discovered before the actual service execution
and therefore causes an Incorrect Input fault.
The third payment service (P3) finally accepts the creden-
tials of our person and the flight can be booked and charged.
As we showed, the presented typical faults in such a
scenario are covered by our fault taxonomy. Consequently,
we can now test our web services more thoroughly for these
faults. Next, we can develop services which can react to such
faults properly.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
SOA is a popular approach in industry and science to design
distributed systems. However, the promises of SOA to allow
loose coupling, dynamic discovery, and composition of inde-
pendent services from different sources have not been quite
fulfilled. Several WSDL extensions and ontology approaches
aim to fill the gap but have not found their way into typical
SOA implementations at this time. It is essential for a truly
dynamic SOA that the properties, semantics, and functional
aspects of services are fully described.
The process of service invocation in SOA has five different
steps that have to be taken to allow dynamic service discovery
and loose coupling. As in distributed systems, faults can occur
at each one of those steps. We proposed a fault taxonomy for
a systematic description of possible faults. Additionally, we
stated which faults can cause other ones. This knowledge is
essential for testing and building dependable systems as well
as for testing the system via fault injection.
Due to the complexity of SOA systems, testing is the com-
monly used support measure for high assurance of reliability,
availability, and security. Testing via fault injection aims at
covering as many fault classes as possible with as few test
cases as possible. Our fault taxonomy facilitates such approach
by abstracting from concrete implementations to a general
understanding of SOA and the steps that are required for
service invocation.
An important aspect is the detectability of the described
faults. This aspect is getting even more difficult because some
faults can be detected by syntax checks (e.g. description
mismatches), whereas other faults can only be detected during
runtime. Fault injection is a valid approach to examine the
fault detection mechanisms. The main benefit of our work is
the identification of typical possible SOA-specific faults.
Next steps in our work will be the setting up of a test
environment and the development of appropriate fault injection
mechanism (e.g. description manipulators, SOAP message
interception mechanisms). This environment will be used to
deploy a feasible test scenario with multiple service providers,
clients, and service invocation scenarios. Subsequently, the
behavior of existing SOA structure like ASG can be examined
and evaluated.
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